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THE SHARING STICK  
IN THE PROPERTY RIGHTS BUNDLE:  
THE CASE OF SHORT TERM RENTALS & HOAS 
Donald J. Kochan* 
Abstract 
Property owners are now more than ever 
exercising the “sharing stick” in their 
metaphorical bundle of property rights. This 
Article examines the right to share one’s property 
with others as a branch, stemming from the 
inclusion stick, that itself grows out of the exclusion 
right held by property owners, along with the legal 
consequences of that characterization.   
The right to share, like other rights, can be given 
up when an owner joins a common interest 
community (CIC).  However, when owners enter 
CICs and agree to governance by a homeowner 
association (HOA), they retain whatever residual 
parts of their ownership bundle they do not give up.  
Recent CIC and HOA cases examined in this 
Article illuminate the existence of a “right to 
share,” where the default rule is that owners of 
real property have the right to engage in short term 
rentals unless they have expressly alienated that 
right through some private agreement.  It will only 
be abrogated upon identifiable language in the 
initial CIC agreement making such diminishment of 
the right possible. 
The issues in several recent cases discussed here, 
regarding whether HOAs can create or enforce 
rules through their covenants, conditions, and 
 
* Parker S. Kennedy Professor in Law and Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, 
Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School, 1998; B.A. Western Michigan 
University, 1995.  This Article evolved from my remarks titled “Traditional Property Principles 
Confronting a Changing World: Selected Recent Case Developments,” delivered on the “Professors 
Panel” at the American Bar Association’s Real Property, Trusts, & Estates (RPTE) Law Section Annual 
Spring Symposium in Denver, Colorado, on April 21, 2017.  I thank Wilson Freyermuth for organizing 
that panel and for the invitation to participate, as well as for offering comments on the Article.  I also 
appreciate the research assistance of Bethany Espinosa and the editorial suggestions of Jennifer Spinella 
in completing this project.  
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restrictions (CC&Rs) that prohibit short term 
rentals, are in essence asking whether the 
association and community are empowered to limit 
the sharing stick in the bundle.  The primary 
questions discussed relate to whether, when, and 
how an association can impose limitations or 
prohibitions on short term rentals under existing 
authorities where such express substantive 
authority is not clearly, expressly given, and when 
the CIC must instead seek to undertake 
extraordinary measures like amendment to a CIC’s 
declaration in order to empower an HOA to so 
limit where it could not before.  This Article 
concludes that the judicial interpretation of scope 
of CIC and HOA authority in relation to short term 
rentals demonstrates the strength of the sharing 
right.  However, these cases also reveal that this 
sharing right may be consensually limited if the 
initial CIC declaration or valid subsequent 
amendments grant the proper HOA authority to do 
so. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Short term rentals (STRs) of dwelling units—while not an entirely 
new phenomena—have “exploded” in popularity with the rise of the 
“sharing economy,” the emergence of companies facilitating such 
rentals like Airbnb and HomeAway, and the development of the entire 
infrastructure and technological assistance that lowers transactions costs 
associated with such arrangements.1  Property owners are exercising the 
“sharing stick” in their property rights bundle now more than ever. Not 
 
 1. The Washington Post Editorial Board opined on the trend in early 2017: 
Home-sharing services such as Airbnb have exploded over the past few years, 
which is good. Travelers get more options — both in terms of price and location 
— and property owners can make money on spare rooms or on their apartments 
while they are away. With some basic regulations, meanwhile, cities can become 
more attractive to visitors and collect hotel tax revenues. Win-win-win. 
See, e.g., Editorial, The District’s Airbnb Bill is Too Restrictive, WASH. POST, (Feb. 4, 2017) at 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-districts-airbnb-bill-is-too-
restrictive/2017/02/04/556c1d66-e993-11e6-80c2-30e57e57e05d_story.html?utm_term=.96c022aeb3eb; 
see also Shelly Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property in the Sharing Economy, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 61, 63 
(2016) (“a new economic phenomenon is gradually changing the rules of the game. The sharing 
economy has taken the media, social networks, and public discourse by storm.”); The Rise of the 
Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything is for Hire, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy.  
2
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surprisingly, the increased adaptation of residential properties into units 
available for short term stays by strangers, with occupancy that is more 
dynamic, has generated controversy—including because neighbors are 
not always happy with what they see as a disruptive transformation of a 
previously more stable community due to a rise in transient occupancy.2   
While debates over how to handle or potentially regulate such 
disruption are occurring generally within communities of all types, the 
use of short term rentals inside common interest communities (CICs) 
with homeowners associations (HOAs) raise particularly interesting 
legal issues.  CICs and HOAs are designed to create governance rules 
and mechanisms that appeal to some purchasers.  Individuals wishing to 
receive the benefits of these structures can buy into the CIC as offered 
by developers, accepting restrictions on their autonomy in the process.  
The combined collective of purchasers with common preferences that 
buy in can thereby enter into private agreements with enforceable 
mandates—enforced primarily through “declarations” and associated 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs).3   
New battles are brewing within CICs where some owners wish to 
take advantage of their rights to offer their homes for short term rentals 
while other community members see negative externalities from such 
rights that they wish to curtail.  Among the questions raised in such 
clashes are three of particular interest for this Article.  First, do existing 
community declarations and rules already prohibit short term rentals 
under provisions that limit units to “residential” purposes, “single family 
homes,” non-commercial uses, non-transient uses, or the like?  Second, 
if existing association rules do not yet prohibit short term rentals, may 
associations or boards amend the rules to prohibit or otherwise limit 
short term rentals?  Finally, if associations or boards do not have wide 
enough authority to amend ordinary rules to prohibit or otherwise limit 
short term rentals, may the bylaws or declaration of the CIC be changed, 
following appropriate procedures set out in the community’s governing 
documents, to so prohibit or limit such short term rentals?  This Article 
examines recent case developments that provide some answers to, and 
guidance on, these questions. 
As explained in later parts of this Article, the cases have shaken out in 
a way that supports the existence of a “sharing stick” within the bundle 
of sticks representing property rights to which property owners are 
 
 2. Kellen Zale, Sharing Property, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2016) (“The sharing 
economy—the rapidly evolving sector of peer-to-peer transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is 
nothing if not controversial.”). 
 3. ROBERT G. NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS §2.4 (1989) (explaining 
the role of general declarations, CC&Rs and bylaws); see also generally Uriel Reichman, Residential 
Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 253 (1976). 
3
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entitled to lay claim.  In other words, the case law supports the existence 
of a “right to share,” where the default rule is that owners of real 
property have the right to engage in short term rentals unless they have 
expressly alienated that right through some private agreement.  Such 
sharing rights, while alienable, are, of course, subject to regulation in the 
ordinary course of municipal, state, and federal governance—but these 
topics of public land use controls are beyond the scope of this article.4  
Part II introduces some basic background on the sharing economy, 
including homesharing through short term rentals.  Part III explains why 
sharing is a stick in a property owner’s bundle of rights, branching off 
from the right to include others in the access, use and enjoyment of 
one’s property.  This characterization of sharing as a right is critical to 
understanding how it can be regulated (by private or public governing 
structures) and also to how agreements, including declarations in 
common interest communities, should be interpreted in relation to the 
retained rights of community owners and the rights subject to 
community control.  Part IV discusses the bargain an owner makes when 
agreeing to be governed by common interest community rules.  In 
particular, Part IV explains the level of acceptable indeterminacy of 
rights and assumption of risk when a property owner in a governed 
community consents to future changes in the CC&Rs.  Part V then 
focuses on recent case developments that provide some insight into 
when and how common interest communities can prohibit or regulate 
short term rentals.  Part V also examines the different standards applied 
by courts when reviewing changes in rules where the scope of HOA 
board authority is more constrained and when reviewing changes 
effected by amendment through supermajority procedures where 
approval is more liberally granted in the courts. Part V is focused on 
examining HOA scope of authority issues, but does not address issues 
associated with the next step of concern—how the courts might police 
the exercise of that authority through appropriateness, reasonableness, or 
business judgment standards.  Those issues are left for later work.   
This Article concludes that the interpretation of scope of authority 
and amendment concerns associated with the short term rental 
controversies in the courts demonstrate the strength of the sharing right, 
however these cases also reveal that this sharing right may be 
consensually limited if the initial CIC declaration or valid subsequent 
amendments grant the HOA proper authority to do so.  While the 
sharing stick is strong, it is alienable.  It is, like other rights, capable of 
 
 4. See generally, e.g., Stephen R. Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 
53 HARV. J. LEG. 147 (2016) (providing an overview of regulatory models and theories for the sharing 
economy); Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397 (2016) (building 
on insights from pluralistic theory to develop a contextual regulatory model for the sharing economy). 
4
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becoming subject to voluntarily accepted constraints, when an owner 
chooses to otherwise take advantage of the perceived benefits of 
common interest community living by ceding certain rights.5 
II.  THE EVOLVING AND EXPANDING SHARING ECONOMY AND SHORT 
TERM RENTALS 
The concept of sharing—while part of human culture from its 
origins—has evolved into a sophisticated and coordinated system of 
market engagement.6  Enterprising individuals have identified ways to 
feed the sharing spirit.  They are responding to the demand for 
alternative means of access to property and goods by capitalizing on 
new platforms that can facilitate collaborative, access-based 
consumption.7  Miller has explained that, because of these new forces, 
“[s]haring is no longer an idiosyncratic pursuit; it is now a mainstream 
manner of consumption.”8  Although a relatively new phenomenon, the 
literature on the sharing economy is already substantial,9 where many 
 
 5. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV.  
1519, 1523 n.20 (1982) (“decision to join an association is as voluntary as a human decision can be”). 
 6. See, e.g., John J. Horton & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Owning, Using and Renting: Some Simple 
Economics of the “Sharing Economy,” Harv. Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research Working Paper No. RWP 
16-007, Feb. 10, 2016, available at https://research.hks.harvard.edu/publications/getFile.aspx?Id=1307, 
at 1 (“In recent years, technology startup firms have created a new kind of rental market, in which 
owners sometimes use their assets for personal consumption and sometimes rent them out. Such markets 
are referred to as peer-to-peer or ‘sharing economy’ markets.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative 
Capitalist System, 40 TUL. L. REV. 241, 243 (2015) (explaining “collaborative consumption” and “peer-
to-peer” as alternative labels to describe “the sharing economy”); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can 
Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 991 (2016) (“Also known as ‘collaborative 
consumption,’ the ‘peer-to-peer economy’ or ‘peer-to-peer consumption,’ a broad range of 
commentators suggest that the sharing economy is transforming the way people consume and supply 
goods and services, such as transportation, accommodations, and task help.”); Juho Hamari, Mimmi 
Sjöklint, & Antti Ukkonen, The Sharing Economy: Why People Participate in Collaborative 
Consumption, J. ASS’N. INFO. SCI. & TECH., July 2015, at 2049, available at  
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/255698095_The_Sharing_Economy_Why_People_Participate
_in_Collaborative_Consumption (“We define the term CC broadly as the peer-to-peer-based activity of 
obtaining, giving, or sharing access to goods and services, coordinated through community-based online 
services.”); Miller, supra note 4, at 150 (describing alternative names including “collaborative 
consumption” and “access-based consumption”). 
 8. Miller, supra note 4, at 201. 
 9. See, e.g., RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF 
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010); Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, The Sharing Economy 
as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016); John Infranca, Intermediary 
Institutions and the Sharing Economy, 90 TUL. L. REV. ONLINE 29, 31 (2016); Miller, supra note 4; 
Zale, supra note 2, at 502-03 (“The sharing economy—the rapidly evolving sector of peer-to-peer 
transactions epitomized by Airbnb and Uber—is nothing if not controversial.”); Jordan M. Barry & Paul 
L. Caron, Tax Regulation, Transportation Innovation, and the Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 
DIALOGUE 69, 70 (2015); Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 7; Christopher Koopman, 
Matthew Mitchell & Adam Thierer, The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The 
5
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articles have provided comprehensive summaries and analyses generally 
of various and diverse sharing markets.  As such, this Article will only 
briefly sketch the homesharing and short term rental market to provide 
context for our later discussion on the existence of a sharing stick in the 
bundle of property rights and our analysis of homeowner association 
reactions to homesharing.10 
“Sharing” as used in the “sharing economy” generally means that 
assets or services—like one’s home in the homesharing and short term 
rentals markets—are allowed to be accessed, possessed, used or 
consumed by someone other than the property owner (or, in other 
contexts, the provider of the services).11  The rationale underlying the 
efficiencies of sharing for property owners, consumers, and the overall 
market rests on the idea of tapping underutilized resources and making 
them accessible to be used.  Koopman et al., posit, “It is helpful to think 
of the sharing economy as any marketplace that brings together 
distributed networks of individuals to share or exchange otherwise 
underutilized assets.”12 Sharers are owners with assets that have become 
capable of economically being monetized with the aid of technology13 
and sharees have found new products being marketed to them that were 
unavailable before or, if available, at higher prices and with less 
choice.14 
 
Case for Policy Change, 8 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 529, 530-31 (2015); Kreiczer-Levy, supra 
note 1; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Sharing the Cathedral, 46 CONN. L. REV. 647 (2013); Aloni, supra note 4. 
 10. For a good primer on homesharing, see Georgios Zervas, David Proserpio, & John W. Byers, 
The Rise of the Sharing Economy: Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, B.U. Sch. 
Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2013-16, last revised Nov. 18, 2016, at 2 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2366898 (for example, reporting Airbnb as having an estimated valuation at 
over $30 billion). 
 11. As I have summarized elsewhere: 
[P]roperty that is shared in this sector is used or accessed rather than owned[;] the 
transfer of possession to facilitate such use or access is temporary rather than 
permanent and involves something less than granting an ownership share[;] . . . 
the sharer retains ownership the entire time and has an enforceable expectation for 
a return of any property and the cessation of use at a pre-determined future point 
in time.   
Donald J. Kochan, I Share, Therefore It’s Mine, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 909, 931 (2017); see also Rachel 
Botsman, The Sharing Economy Lacks a Shared Definition, FAST COMPANY (Nov. 21, 2013), 
http://www.fastcoexist.com/3022028/the-sharing-economy-lacks-a-shareddefinition (describing the 
sharing economy as an “economic model based on sharing underutilized assets . . . for monetary or non-
monetary benefits.”). 
 12. Koopman et al., supra note 9, at 531. 
 13. Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption Property, supra note 1, at 76 (“From the owner’s perspective, 
there are certain types of goods that have excess capacity when they are privately owned and consumed.  
Because the excess capacity is not used, certain types of goods are systematically underexploited.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 14. Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing, supra note 7, at 253-54 (“In the areas of home and car 
sharing . . . individuals also share the excess capacity of assets that they do not fully use or need for 
themselves with strangers—for a price.”). 
6
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“Property sharing,” according to Professor Zale, includes 
homesharing and occurs “when property owned or possessed by Party A 
is temporarily used or accessed by Party B (either exclusively or 
simultaneously with A), with ownership or possession returning to Party 
A after an agreed-upon period of time.”15 Property sharing is only one 
category of sharing evolving in the present marketplace and thereby 
“makes up only part of the overall sharing economy.”16  In previous 
work, I have proposed the following definition for “sharing” in the 
sharing economy, which is particularly sensitive to the ideas that (1) 
property owners are sharing things they own, (2) are doing so precisely 
because they have the power to do so as owners, because (3) they own a 
sharing stick in their bundle of property rights: 
 
Sharing of a good or real property exists when Owner (O) 
exercises her right to include by authorizing a Stranger to the 
property (S) the temporary right to use or access O’s property in 
some limited and defined manner—converting what would have 
been a trespassory act by S into a legal, non-trespassory act—
where such authorization is revocable by O in property law but 
where liability may exist in contract for any such revocation or 
interference by O in the rights or authority granted by O to S.17 
 
Because one owns what they share, sharing and non-sharing are 
available choices.  When an owner chooses to share with another—i.e., 
exercises their right to include another in the access and benefits of her 
property—she may also then set the terms of the inclusion and charge 
for the benefits, as property owners do when they engage in short term 
rentals for homesharing.  
The reason we have seen the rise of Airbnb, HomeAway, VRBO, and 
other homesharing platforms—not to mention the platforms for sharing 
other types of property, goods, and services—is not just demand, it is 
also the advent of technological capacity that has only recently 
materialized to create the necessary market infrastructure, complete with 
reliability and security measures, necessary to make such sharing 
efficient.18 As lower-cost, higher reliability mechanisms for making 
sharing more accessible and more profitable improve, expansion of 
 
 15. Zale, supra note 2, at 511-12. 
 16. Id. at 512.  
 17. Kochan, supra note 11, at 947. 
 18. Barry & Caron, supra note 9, at 70-71 (2015); see also Kreiczer-Levy, Consumption 
Property, supra note 1, at 77 (discussing how “new technologies and online markets have significantly 
lowered transaction costs for short term use of personal assets”); The Rise of the Sharing Economy, 
supra note 1 (“technology has reduced transaction costs, making sharing assets cheaper and easier than 
ever—and therefore possible on a much larger scale”). 
7
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sharing activity follows.   Professor Lee explains that new “[t]echnology 
has enabled innovative forms of exchange to emerge, spanning an ever-
broader range of products and services.”19  Making connections between 
suppliers of shared products and consumers is cheaper and easier 
because of information technology.20 Internet-based social networking 
capabilities and popularity also take some of the risk out of contracting 
with strangers.  Trust- and reputation-networks that create monitoring, 
verification, and quality-control mechanisms are key management tools 
that make using sharing platforms attractive and less dangerous.21  
Reliable monitoring and rating systems simply could not exist at the 
scale now available without the development of the information 
technology and internet networking capabilities brought to us by 
technological innovation.  These systems generate confidence for 
consumers and for suppliers, each made more comfortable entering 
these sharing arrangements because they know accountability and 
reputational rating systems are available to assist their decisionmaking 
and deter bad behavior.22 A story in The Economist articulated it as a 
system where “the availability of more data about people and things . . .  
allows physical assets to be disaggregated and consumed as services.”23  
This technological infrastructure supports the sharing economy because 
it provides “the market-thickening coordination mechanisms . . . such as 
coordinating on time and geography” previously present only in 
physical markets rather than online.24     
Homesharing—along with other types—has become a major market 
force.  Airbnb,25 for example, which was founded only in 2008, already 
has reportedly “raised more than $3 billion and secured a $1 billion line 
of credit.”26  Upon statements by Airbnb’s chief executive that it could 
be ready to go public in 2018, “[i]nvestors have pegged Airbnb’s value 
at around $30 billion.”27  That company boasts that it alone has 
 
 19. Julia Y. Lee, Trust and Social Commerce, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 141 (2015). 
 20. Hamari et al, supra note 7, at 2048 (crediting technological advances as simplifying “sharing 
of both physical and nonphysical goods and services”); Oei & Ring, supra note 7, at 991 (“The 
technological platforms employed by these startups enable individual producers and consumers to 
transact with each other with unprecedented ease.”). 
 21. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 6, at 2, 8 (explaining that the sharing economy businesses 
have proliferated in part because of technological advances but also emerging “recommender systems 
and reputation systems . . . are central to the function of P2P rental markets.”). 
 22. Id. at 7 (“key challenge in all markets is facilitating trust among strangers”). 
 23. The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 1. 
 24. Horton & Zeckhauser, supra note 6, at 7. 
 25. AIRBNB, www.airbnb.com (last visited November 25, 2018). 
 26. Katie Benner, Inside the Hotel Industry’s Plan to Combat Airbnb, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/16/technology/inside-the-hotel-industrys-plan-to-combat-
airbnb.html. 
 27. Id. 
8
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facilitated about 150 million people staying in the shared homes of 
others in more than 191 countries.28  Moreover, Airbnb is just one 
company – others such as HomeAway,29 VRBO,30 HomeExchange,31 
Love Home Swap,32 and even more local exchange networks like 
ParisBestLodge33 offer similar platforms to facilitate homesharing 
transactions for short term rentals.  While not everyone who uses 
homesharing ends up staying at properties within common interest 
communities, many have been so located and many more community 
property owners and homesharing consumers will want to engage in 
short term rentals in HOA-governed properties in the days ahead.  
Undoubtedly, some neighbors in those CICs will object.  Thus, it is 
critical to evaluate why property owners generally have a right to share 
(discussed next in Part III) and how those rights are affected when a 
property owner purchases within a common interest community and is 
thereby subject to its governance rules and amendment structures 
(discussed in Parts IV-V).     
III.  THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE AND THE “SHARING STICK” IN THE PROPERTY 
RIGHTS BUNDLE 
As I have explained in more detail elsewhere, “the sharing right [is] 
an outgrowth of the inclusion right, which itself grows out of the 
exclusion right held by property owners.”34  Penner has posited, “The 
ability to share one’s things, or let others use them, is fundamental in the 
idea of property.”35    If one owns property, then they control access to 
it.   
A common metaphor for describing the rights associated with 
property ownership is as a “bundle of sticks,” with each “stick” in “the 
bundle” representing some specific attribute of such ownership.  
Guzman provides an excellent description of what it means to have a 
stick in the bundle of property rights: 
 
Legal theory divorces the term “property” from the item itself to 
instead describe relative rights vis-a-vis that item. “Property” thus 
means things one can do with Blackacre (entitlements) including 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. HOMEAWAY, www.homeaway.com (last visited November 25, 2018). 
 30. VRBO, www.vrbo.com (last visited November 25, 2018). 
 31. HOMEEXCHANGE, www.homeexchange.com (last visited November 25, 2018).  
 32. LOVE HOME SWAP, www.lovehomeswap.com (last visited November 25, 2018).  
 33. PARIS BEST LODGE, www.parisbestlodge.com (last visited November 25, 2018).  
 34. Kochan, supra note 11, at 933. 
 35. James E. Penner, The Bundle of Rights Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711, 745 
(1996). 
9
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its use, possession and consumption, as well as enjoying its fruits, 
the ability to exclude others from its use, and the ability to transfer 
it.  Although ownership suggests the assemblage of all such rights 
in one person who then totes the full “bundle of sticks,” one may 
properly speak of “owning” a lone entitlement or stick . . . Legally, 
the right itself is the property.36 
 
Similarly, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, “A common idiom 
describes property as a ‘bundle of sticks’—a collection of individual 
rights which, in certain combinations, constitute property.”37   
The logical existence of the “sharing stick” in the bundle of property 
rights emerges once one examines—as this Part will—the right to 
exclude and the corollary right to include (and its component sharing 
branch).38  Inclusion is one of the rights associated with property 
ownership, i.e., one of the sticks in the ownership bundle.39  This Part 
explains why the right to include is an essential stick in the property 
rights bundle, which includes its own “branch” which I will call the 
“sharing stick in the bundle” that represents an equally important, 
independent and enforceable property right.   
The Supreme Court has regularly given the “right to exclude” 
recognition as fundamental to property.40  Property owners have a 
 
 36. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 614-15 (2000). 
 37. United States v. Craft, 535 U.S. 274 (2002) (citing BENJAMIN CARDOZO, PARADOXES OF 
LEGAL SCIENCE 129 (1928) (reprint 2000) and Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984)); 
see also generally Jane B. Baron, Rescuing the Bundle-of-Rights Metaphor in Property Law, 82 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 57 (2013) (making the case for the utility of the bundle of sticks metaphor for understanding 
many of the issues related to property in property law). 
 38. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014) (discussing exclusion and inclusion as the 
“necessary and sufficient conditions of transferability”). 
 39. Grey’s formulation of the things/bundles debate is illuminative: 
Most people, including most specialists in their unprofessional moments, conceive of 
property as things that are owned by persons.  To own property is to have exclusive 
control over something – to be able to use it as one wishes, to sell it, give it away, 
leave it idle, or destroy it.  Legal restraints on the free use of one’s property are 
conceived as departures from an ideal conception of full ownership.  By contrast, the 
theory of property rights held by the modern specialist . . . fragments the robust 
unitary conception of ownership into a more shadowy “bundle of rights.” 
Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, NOMOS XXII 69, 69 (1980), reprinted in LIBERTY, 
PROPERTY, AND THE LAW: MODERN UNDERSTANDINGS OF LIBERTY AND PROPERTY 291 (Richard A. 
Epstein, ed., 2000); see also Thomas Ross, Metaphor and Paradox, 23 GA. L. REV. 1053, 1061 (1989) 
(“[t]he bundle metaphor…expresses a special sense of the separability of the various sorts of legally 
recognized interests”). 
 40. See, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (“one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property – the right to exclude others”); 
see also College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 (1999) 
(“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others.”); Int’l News Serv. v. 
Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“Property depends upon exclusion 
10
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level of dominion and control that allows them to manage property 
rights, including the power to exercise the right to include which is 
an extension of the choice to not assert the right to exclude.  Kelly 
conducted exhaustive research and analysis on the ubiquity of the 
right to include within property law, and he concluded, “the ability of 
owners to ‘include’ others in their property is a central attribute of 
ownership and fundamental to any system of private property.”41   
Further, this ability to include makes possible mutually beneficial 
exchanges—owners are willing to respond to demand from friends 
and strangers alike who are willing to offer something of value as 
consideration in exchange for being allowed to access the owner’s 
property.  In other words, sharing is made possible.  Dukeminier et 
al. describe this combination as “a relationship among people that 
entitles so-called owners to include (that is, permit) or exclude (that 
is, deny) use or possession of the owned property by other people.”42  
Sharing through short term rentals involves an owner permitting 
another—who might often be a stranger—to share with the owner the 
benefits that the property has to offer.  The owner converts the 
stranger’s status from what would be a trespasser into someone with 
legal rights to temporary possession and use.   
The sharer retains ownership but allows the sharee a privileged use 
of the property.  Sharing—including through homesharing 
contracts—becomes an extension of the primary rights associated 
with one’s ability to use and control the property one owns, including 
to grant access and usage rights.43  That is why Dukeminier et al. 
conclude that “[t]he two rights [to exclude and to include] are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of transferability.”44  The 
inclusion stick and the sharing stick (that offshoots as a branch 
stemming from it) empower owners to permit non-owners to access 
and use their property, including through mechanisms like short term 
rentals.45  
 
by law from interference . . . .”); Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 250 (1918) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“An essential element of individual property is the legal right to exclude 
others from enjoying it.”). 
 41. Daniel B. Kelly, The Right to Include, 63 EMORY L.J. 857, 859 (2014); see also Donald 
Kochan, Property as a Vehicle of Inclusion to Promote Human Sociability, JOTWELL (January 22, 
2016) (reviewing Kelly, supra), http://property.jotwell.com/property-as-a-vehicle-of-inclusion-to-
promote-human-sociability/. 
 42. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014). 
 43. Hamari et al., supra note 7, at 2049 (citing Fleura Bardhi & Giana M. Eckhardt, Access-
Based Consumption: The Case of Car Sharing, 39(4) J. CONSUMER RES. 882–83 (2012)) (“[a]ccess over 
ownership means that users may offer and share their goods and services to other users for a limited 
time through peer-to-peer sharing activities, such as renting and lending.”). 
 44. DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 104 (8th ed. 2014). 
 45. Kelly, supra note 41, at 871-72. 
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Although homeowners give up certain rights and agree to allow their 
ownership to be controlled in some ways when entering a common 
interest community with governance rules, they retain whatever residual 
parts of their ownership bundle they do not give up.46  Thus, it is critical 
to have a sound understanding of what is included in the pre-agreement 
bundle of rights that would otherwise be available before subjecting 
property to a common interest community declaration.  That 
understanding will facilitate the calculation of what was subtracted and 
what remains. 
As will be discussed in more detail in Part V, the litigation over 
whether homeowners associations may impose limitations on short term 
rentals is validation for the position that inclusion and sharing constitute 
default sticks in one’s property ownership bundle.  The issues in such 
cases, regarding whether homeowners associations can create or enforce 
rules through their CC&R’s that prohibit short term rentals, are in 
essence asking whether the association and community are empowered 
to limit the sharing stick in the bundle.47   
Living in a common interest community is all about giving up certain 
rights of ownership (i.e. giving up certain sticks, if you will) in order to 
gain the benefits of community living.48  Included in those benefits is 
the comfort, confidence and security that, while you give up a certain 
right to do X, you know that your neighbor has reciprocally given up the 
right to do X as well, and furthermore has given you the means to 
enforce the obligation as much as the neighbor can do the same.  
Presumably, you value more living in a neighborhood where your 
neighbor cannot do X than you value your own ability to do X.  It is a 
matter of valuing reciprocal obligation. 
In order to determine what rights an owner gave up and what she 
didn’t give up, we need to know the starting package—what was the full 
complement of ownership rights before agreeing to live under the 
common interest community covenants, conditions, and restrictions.  
We look at what the owner has ex ante (or would have if she purchased 
a similar lot outside community rule), what autonomy she agreed to 
 
 46. See, e.g., Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2012) (citing and quoting England v. Atkinson, 196 Ga. 181, 184(1), 26 S.E.2d 431 (1943) 
(“When it is sought to restrict one in the use of his own private property for any lawful purpose, the 
ground for such interference must be clear and indubitable. The word indubitable in its literal sense 
means without doubt.”)). 
 47. See, e.g., Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s Association, Inc., 352 P.3d 492 
(2015) (citing cases from multiple jurisdictions dealing with HOA authority to restrict short-term 
rentals). 
 48. Paula Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of 
Standards, 3 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 663, 671 (2000) (“Restrictions on use are an integral, essential 
aspect of any common interest community, generally regarded as vital to preserving the stable, planned 
environment that shared ownership aims to foster.”). 
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surrender for the benefits of the community, and what residual rights 
were retained.   
Thus, before community living, an owner, for example, might have 
the right to paint her house whatever color she wishes, might be allowed 
to have a pet, and might be allowed to display signs in her windows. 
Yet, she may agree to limits on those rights by joining the community 
and its governance scheme.  She might value not living next to a 
neighbor with a pit bull more than she values owning a poodle, might 
value not looking at a “Trump for President” sign more than she values 
displaying a “Clinton for President” sign, and might value being free 
from viewing a florescent pink house out her window more than she 
values painting her own house green so she agrees to a brown color 
scheme within the community.  However, if the community rules say 
nothing on these rights and do not authorize the HOA to create rules 
related to them, then she has retained those rights and has not consented 
to their control by the HOA (other than by generally applicable rules as 
to the exercise of rights—like nuisance provisions or assessments for 
damages to community property, for example).   
The same alienability questions arise with the sharing right.  It is 
possible for an owner to surrender the sharing stick under a common 
interest community agreement just like any other right, but the owner 
starts with it inside her bundle absent the agreement or if she were to 
buy in a place not requiring submission to association rules.  It is an 
ingredient in her ownership package until it is not.  She may consent to 
part with it, but like other rights inherent in ownership, we must 
examine the facts to determine whether that sharing stick, which begins 
inside the bundle, has been voluntarily been made unassertable and 
unexercisable.  Unless the sharing stick has been removed from the 
owner’s collection of enforceable rights within her ownership bundle 
(such as by subjecting her control and use decisions to a collective 
governance body by joining an HOA and committing to certain 
CC&Rs), such owner has retained the default right to share her property 
with others, including through short term rentals.49 
IV.  SOME BACKGROUND ON THE ASSUMPTION OF RISK OF RIGHTS’ 
CURTAILMENT BY OWNERS PURCHASING PROPERTY WITHIN COMMON 
INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
When a common interest community is formed and the initial 
declaration and bylaws are created, the scope of initial and possible 
 
 49. Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789, 792 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2012) (covenants silent on rentals did not authorize limits on STRs, especially because “restrictions 
upon an owner’s use of land must be clearly established” in covenants if such uses are to be precluded). 
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future restrictions is identified through sometimes broadly worded 
covenants, conditions, and restrictions with delegated rulemaking 
authority to the HOA to implement the declaration’s mandate.50  If a rule 
can be adopted within the scope of the delegated authority, the HOA is 
empowered to create such a rule through what might be called the 
ordinary course51—general procedures of HOA board voting, often 
requiring simple majority of that HOA representative body, as 
contrasted with extraordinary measures requiring voting by all 
constituent owners before major changes may be adopted.52   
On the latter matters, at the time the common interest community is 
formed, it also usually sets forth in its bylaws the manner by which the 
general governance declaration can be amended, including expanding or 
contracting the scope of HOA authority by altering the substantive 
breadth of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions.53  These are often 
subject to requirements for votes by a supermajority of property owners 
in the community and other procedures that are meant to make such 
changes difficult, work to keep the rules relatively stable, and are 
designed to generate consensus for change.54  Such amendments change 
the HOA board’s authorization to act as an agent of the community.55  
Thus, even if an HOA board cannot regulate STRs under the initial 
authorization—for example, when it cannot twist CC&Rs limiting 
dwellings to residential purposes far enough to find authority to ban 
STRs—it might gain that authority after a declaration amendment.56 
In either of these situations—by ordinary HOA rulemaking or by CIC 
amendment—matters of consent arise regarding whether and how 
certain rights will be governed or are governable, both now and in the 
future. This Part will briefly explore the consequence of purchasing 
property in a CIC subject to its rule structures, including governance 
bodies like HOAs.  
 
 50. See Franzese, supra note 48, at 672 (“Typically, restrictions are imposed in the community’s 
declaration of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&R) (alternatively called the “Declaration of 
Condominium”) or by board-passed resolution or decision, usually rendered on a case-by-case basis in 
response to a given resident’s application to do something not specifically allowed or proscribed by the 
CC&R.”). 
 51. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §4.1 (discussing association rulemaking powers and their limits) 
 52. Id. §3.3.2.1 (describing typical supermajority vote requirements for extraordinary actions 
while simple majority rule governs ordinary actions). 
 53. Id. §3.4.2 (describing sources of association powers). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. §2.5 (“In a subdivision in which the servitudes have created a Property owners 
Association, the founders purposes [as identified in the declaration] are central to determining the 
association’s proper organization, powers, and duties.”). 
 56. See, e.g., North Country Properties, LLC v. Lost Acres Homeowners Ass’n of Burnett, 879 
N.W.2d 810, ¶¶ 5, 8 (Ct. App. Wisc. 2016) (unpublished) (upholding restriction on short term rentals 
after “requisite number of lot owners agreed to and recorded the amendments prohibiting”). 
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Property owners choose to enter common interest communities and 
are willing to be “governed” and “limited” in their rights to achieve their 
preferences to live in a community of ordered rules.57  The voluntariness 
of the exercise is key, for individuals need not subject themselves to 
such private governance.58  However, property owners are willing to 
give up considerable autonomy by joining common interest 
communities and subjecting themselves to governance by HOAs in 
order to get the benefits of living in such a community.  As the 
California Supreme Court explained in Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village 
Condominium Association, “subordination of individual property rights 
to the collective judgment of the owners association together with 
restrictions on the use of real property comprise the chief attributes of 
owning property in a common interest development.”59  In Hidden 
Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman,60 a Florida state court captured well 
the autonomy/governance tradeoffs involved in common interest 
communities. In its oft-cited description, the court discussed the 
voluntary relinquishment by homeowners of freedom of choice when 
entering into condominium or other common interest communities: 
 
It appears to us that inherent in the condominium concept is the 
principle that to promote the health, happiness, and peace of mind 
of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such 
close proximity and using facilities in common, each unit owner 
must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he might 
otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property. 
Condominium unit owners comprise a little democratic sub society 
of necessity more restrictive as it pertains to use of condominium 
 
 57. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, The Serene Fortress: Many Seek Security in Private Communities, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1995, Sec. 1, at 1 (“The fastest-growing residential communities in the nation are 
private and usually gated, governed by a thicket of covenants, codes, and restrictions” where individuals 
have “chosen to wall themselves off, opting for private government”). 
 58. Consider the following description of the balance struck when choosing to voluntarily 
subject one’s self and her property to a private governance system: 
[A]greement to submit to the decisionmaking authority of a cooperative board is 
voluntary in a sense that submission to government authority is not; there is 
always the freedom not to purchase the apartment. The stability offered by 
community control, through a board, has its own economic and social benefits, 
and purchase of a cooperative apartment represents a voluntary choice to cede 
certain of the privileges of single ownership to a governing body, often made up 
of fellow tenants who volunteer their time, without compensation. The board, in 
return, takes on the burden of managing the property for the benefit of the 
proprietary lessees. 
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 536-37 (N.Y. 1990) (citing Sterling 
Vill. Condo., Inc. v. Breitenbach, 251 So. 2d 685, 688 n. 6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971)). 
 59. 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 1994). 
 60. 309 So. 2d 180, 181–82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) [hereinafter Hidden Harbour I]. 
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property than may be existent outside the condominium 
organization.61 
 
As the court in Nahrstedt also counseled, there are “limitations on 
personal autonomy that are inherent in the concept of shared ownership 
of residential property” of “common interest developments” that are 
accepted by the homeowners when they choose to purchase property 
within such communities and agree to be governed by the community’s 
private governance system.62  Owners in common interest communities 
agree to a diminished level of autonomous control over property uses 
even beyond what would otherwise be permitted outside the community 
and under public governance rules; they agree to not always wear a 
crown claiming to be king of their own castle, understanding that they 
may be ruled by others.63 
Owners agree to tolerate and pre-consent to interference with what 
would otherwise be their property rights.64  The existing restrictions at 
the point of agreement and entry into the common interest community, 
along with new restrictions within the association or board’s authority to 
adopt, are “essentially self-imposed.”65  As one New York state court 
put it, “Because of the manner in which ownership in a condominium is 
structured, the individual unit owner, in choosing to purchase the unit, 
must give up certain of the rights and privileges which traditionally 
attend fee ownership of real property and agree to subordinate them to 
the group’s interest.”66  This consent usually includes an understanding 
that the governing board of the association will have broad powers and 
wide latitude to impose restrictions or other rules consistent with its 
mandate to advance community interests identified in the association’s 
 
 61. Id.; see also Noble v. Murphy, 34 Mass. App. Ct. 452, 455–56 (1993) (citing Kaplan v. 
Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 438 (1991); Hidden Harbour I, 309 So.2d at 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)) 
(“Central to the concept of condominium ownership is the principle that each owner, in exchange for the 
benefits of association with other owners, ‘must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice which he 
might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.’”). 
 62. Nahrstedt, supra note 59.  
 63. See Sterling Vill. Condo., 251 So. 2d at 688 (“Every man may justly consider his home his 
castle and himself as the king thereof; nonetheless his sovereign fiat to use his property as he pleases 
must yield, at least in degree, where ownership is in common or cooperation with others.”). 
 64. Tropicana Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Tropical Condo., LLC, 208 So. 3d 755, 759 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2016) (“Due to the uniqueness of condominium living, condominium associations have a degree of 
control over the ownership of units and, concomitantly, individual owners tolerate a degree of intrusion 
into their property ownership.”). 
 65. Franklin v. Spadafora, 388 Mass. 764, 773 (1983) (“Since the plaintiffs’ decisions to 
purchase units within the condominium were no doubt voluntary, any restrictions imposed on the 
plaintiffs’ right to buy or sell property within the condominium are, for this reason, essentially self-
imposed.”). 
 66. Schoninger v. Yardarm Beach Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 134 A.D.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1987). 
16
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/1
2018] SHORT TERM RENTALS AND HOAS 909 
bylaws, declaration, or other governing documents.67  
Consequently, individual owners are agreeing to a certain amount of 
indeterminacy of their rights, which may change as the board, or its 
rules, change in reasonably anticipated ways contemplated by the scope 
of the initial consent.  In fact, “[t]hrough the exercise of this authority, to 
which would-be apartment owners must generally acquiesce, a 
governing board may significantly restrict the bundle of rights a 
property owner normally enjoys.”68  Moreover, courts often favor strict 
enforcement of common interest community governance rules—
including the rights in these “private constitutions” to change the rules—
precisely because, while one individual owner may object, one owner’s 
rights are subordinated to the will of the collective precisely because the 
remaining owners have reliance interests in the enforcement of the 
community scheme.69   
There is, in effect, an assumption of risk that the rules could change.70  
New rules might be adopted under existing board authority and, when 
necessary, amendments may be made to the community’s governing 
documents to expand or contract board authority, increasing or 
decreasing the scope of the board’s rulemaking power.71  Both 
expansions and contractions can affect property rights, because some 
owners may buy into a community relying on the presence and 
enforceability of existing restrictions, just as much as some might buy in 
based on the absence of certain restrictions.  The California Supreme 
Court in Nahrstedt described this assumption of risk well when it quoted 
Natelson’s observations that “owners associations ‘can be a powerful 
force for good or for ill’ in their members’ lives;”72 and “anyone who 
 
 67. Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 536 (N.Y. 1990) (“owners 
consent to be governed, in certain respects, by the decisions of a board” and “such governing boards are 
responsible for running the day-to-day affairs of the cooperative and to that end, often have broad 
powers in areas that range from financial decisionmaking to promulgating regulations”). 
 68. Levandusky, 75 N.Y.2d at 536. 
 69. As one Florida court explained: 
[S]trict enforcement of the restrictions of an association’s private constitution, 
that is, its declaration of condominium, protects the members’ reliance interests in 
a document which they have knowingly accepted, and accomplishes the desirable 
goal of “allowing the establishment of, and subsequently protecting the integrity 
of, diverse types of private residential communities, [thus providing] genuine 
choice among a range of stable living arrangements.” 
Aquarian Found., Inc. v. Sholom House, Inc., 448 So. 2d 1166, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting 
Robert Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519, 1527 (1982)). 
 70. Villa De Las Palmas Homeowners Assn. v. Terifaj, 33 Cal. 4th 73, 85 (2004) (“A 
prospective homeowner who purchases property in a common interest development should be aware 
that new rules and regulations may be adopted by the homeowners association either through the 
board’s rulemaking power or through the association’s amendment powers.”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Nahrstedt, supra note 59 (citing Robert G. Natelson, Consent, Coercion, and 
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buys a unit in a common interest development with knowledge of its 
owners association’s discretionary power accepts ‘the risk that the 
power may be used in a way that benefits the commonality but harms 
the individual.’”73 
When an owner purchases units subject to a declaration that can be 
amended so long as certain procedures are followed, they are on notice 
of the possible change and face a high hurdle to challenge a change that 
should have been foreseeable as somehow contrary to their rights.74 
Property owners are willing to live with the uncertainty of changing 
rules and the possibility of amendments to declarations or bylaws (i.e. 
are willing to give up some certainty and predictability in how they can 
use their property) in order to get the benefits of the community.  They 
accept the risk of change.  They know in advance that the rules might 
change and that they are often subjecting themselves to the will of the 
majority in an HOA.   
The question, though, is determining the breadth of that agreement 
and the scope of anticipated interference.  While property owners agree 
to allow changes in rules, property owners in HOAs expect the changes 
to go only so far.75  The next Part in this Article will show some specific 
 
“Reasonableness” In Private Law: The Special Case of The Property Owners Association, 51 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 41, 43 (1990)). 
 73. Id. (citing Natelson, supra note 72, at 67).  
 74. Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Jahren, 806 So. 2d 452, 460-61 (Fla. 2002) (“we find 
that respondents were on notice that the unique form of ownership they acquired when they purchased 
their units in the Woodside Village Condominium was subject to change through the amendment 
process, and that they would be bound by properly adopted amendments.”)  The Woodside opinion has a 
useful string of citations in it on this concept: 
See Kroop v. Caravelle Condo., Inc., 323 So.2d 307, 309 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975) 
(upholding restriction limiting leasing to once during ownership where 
condominium owner acquired unit with knowledge that the declaration might 
thereafter be lawfully amended); see also Ritchey v. Villa Nueva Condo. Ass’n, 
81 Cal.App.3d 688, 146 Cal.Rptr. 695, 700 (1978) (noting that declaration 
provided bylaws could be amended and that purchaser would be subject to any 
reasonable amendment properly adopted); McElveen-Hunter v. Fountain Manor 
Ass’n, Inc., 96 N.C.App. 627, 386 S.E.2d 435, 436 (1989), aff’d, 328 N.C. 84, 
399 S.E.2d 112 (1991) (noting that plaintiff acquired her units subject to the right 
of other owners to restrict their occupancy through properly enacted amendments 
to the declaration); Worthinglen Condo. Unit Owners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 57 Ohio 
App.3d 73, 566 N.E.2d 1275, 1277 (1989) (stating that purchasers of 
condominium units should realize that the regime in existence at the time of 
purchase may not continue indefinitely and that changes in the declaration may 
take the form of restrictions on the unit owners’ use of their property); cf. Burgess 
v. Pelkey, 738 A.2d 783, 789 (D.C.1999) (stating unit owner was on notice at 
time of purchase of the possibility that his rights in the cooperative could be 
affected by subsequent changes in the cooperative’s bylaws and house rules). 
Woodside Vill. Condo. Ass’n., 806 So. 2d at 461. 
 75. NATELSON, supra note 3, at § 3.1 (association gets its power from declaration and founding 
documents and cannot exercised powers not conferred). Courts also examine the exercise of rules by 
boards and community amendments under a variety of tests, including looking at compliance with 
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applications of these tests in relation to short term rental rules and 
amendments.  Homeowners must be able to anticipate possible changes 
in HOA declarations and bylaws before it can be said that they 
consented to new restrictive authority purportedly created after they 
joined.76  Changes must be consistent with expectations.  Owners should 
be able to predict how the rules might change—to identify a foreseeable 
bandwidth of available options for altering their usage rights.   If a rule 
or even a declaration or bylaw change goes too far, then it is not 
authorized. 
V.  THE TREATMENT OF SHORT TERM RENTALS UNDER COMMON 
INTEREST COMMUNITY AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION GOVERNANCE 
RULES AND PROCEDURES 
While there are many cases addressing whether individual owners 
subject to certain covenants may engage in short term rental operations 
dating back decades,77 and while “boarding” is an age-old property 
concept,78 the sharing economy boom is bringing heightened attention to 
permission issues, including how CC&Rs should work in relation to 
homeowners rights to include.  These cases are highly fact-specific and 
language dependent, often turning on interpretations of the restrictions, 
of the rights of owners, and of the authorities granted HOAs in 
governing documents. 
Of course, if an owner buys into a common interest community where 
a prohibition on, or the authority to, regulate short term rentals is already 
clearly and expressly included in the agreement, then they have 
consented to that substantive limitation on rights—subject, of course, to 
 
procedures laid out in the governing bylaws, a reasonableness standard upon application of authority, 
and the business judgment rule for certain decisions.  “Certainly, the association is not at liberty to adopt 
arbitrary or capricious rules bearing no relationship to the health, happiness and enjoyment of life of the 
various unit owners.” Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Norman, 309 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1975) (“If a rule is reasonable the association can adopt it; it not, it cannot. It is not necessary that 
conduct be so offensive as to constitute a nuisance in order to justify regulation thereof.”); see also 
Levandusky v. One Fifth Ave. Apartment Corp., 75 N.Y.2d 530, 537 (N.Y. 1990) (an exemplar for the 
application of the business judgment rule).  A full explication of those standards of review for the 
exercise of authority—as distinguished from scope of authority—is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 76. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §2.5 (“In construing the effect of a subdivision declaration, it 
frequently is necessary to determine the scope of the servitudes the declaration contains.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Yogman v. Parrott, 921 P.2d 1352, 1353 (Or. Ct. App. 1996) (STRs were not 
“nonresidential” nor “commercial” in violation of subdivision covenants); Miesch v. Ocean Dunes 
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 464 S.E.2d 64, 66, 68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995) (HOA did not have authority to 
impose maintenance assessment and user fees on short term renters because it violates express rights of 
unit owners who rent to such short term renters). 
 78. See generally, e.g., WENDY GAMBER, THE BOARDINGHOUSE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY 
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other rules of reasonableness and general limits on governance 
authorities.  In fact, many new neighborhoods are realizing the need to 
be intentional in drafting to make sure their declaration reflects whether 
the community supports or shuns homesharing.79   
This Article focuses only on whether provisions in agreements are 
interpreted to allow prohibition or limitation of short term rentals at all, 
aside from how such authority could be exercised if it indeed exists 
within the scope of possible restrictions.80  The latter issues are no doubt 
important and consider, for example, questions like whether the exercise 
of authority is reasonable, appropriate, in good faith, or the exercise of 
sound business judgment.81  Nonetheless, those standards of review 
regarding the exercise of proper substantive authority are mostly beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
The primary questions discussed in this Part relate to whether, when, 
and how an association can impose limitations or prohibitions on short 
term rentals under existing authorities where such express substantive 
authority is not clearly, expressly given.  These situations involve 
whether HOAs may adopt rules relating to short term rentals through 
previously granted authority to promote residential and single family 
uses or to control against transient or commercial uses, for example; or, 
alternatively, whether and how a community might vote to amend its 
declaration to expand HOA authority so that it more clearly reaches 
authorization to control short term rentals and homesharing activities.  
As to the former, many courts have found that HOAs cannot fit square 
pegs into round holes, instead requiring that the hole be altered through 
properly completed amendment procedures.82  
A large number of cases have found that, as traditionally written, 
 
 79. See, e.g., Brian Eason, Homeowners Associations Clamp Down on Rentals, USA TODAY 
(Oct. 4, 2012, 9:17 PM), (“Most of the covenants for brand new neighborhoods within the last few years 
have leasing restrictions”),  https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2012/10/04/homeowners-
oppose-rentals/1614229/.  
 80. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §4.2 ((1) ordinary HOA rules must find the affirmative source of 
their authority in the founding documents like the declaration; and then (2) the exercise of that authority 
must also be reasonable; and (3) the means “must not offend any provision in the declaration or other 
documents of superior force”). 
 81. Franzese, supra note 48, at 666, 676-96 (explaining that the exercise of authority even when 
within scope of available restrictions must still be tested, for example, under standards of 
reasonableness, appropriateness, good faith, and business judgment). 
 82. See, e.g., Wilkinson v. Chiwawa Cmty’s. Ass’n, 327 P.3d 614, 616 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) 
(interpreting covenants as not prohibiting short term rentals and holding that an amendment prohibiting 
STRs would require unanimous approval because not related to existing covenants); Houston v. Wilson 
Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 P.3d 255 (Colo. Ct. App. 2015) (if association wants to 
prohibit short term rentals, it needed more than simple procedural amendments); Estates at Desert Ridge 
Trails Homeowners Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (if community wanted to bar 
short term rentals, because authority did not exist under “residential use” limitation, an amendment to 
declaration would be necessary). 
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many CC&Rs do not prohibit short term rentals or should be interpreted 
as allowing them—because they lack direct language prohibiting short 
term rentals,83 include language allowing leasing but without time 
specifications,84 have limits on using property only for “residential 
use,”85 limit usage to “single family homes,”86 require usage be non-
commercial or non-business,87 prohibit transient use,88 and the like, or at 
least because they are ambiguous as to whether the CC&Rs limit or 
 
 83. See, e.g., Grave de Peralta v. Blackberry Mountain Ass’n, Inc., 726 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2012) (where covenants were silent on rentals, STR limits not valid). 
 84. See, e.g., Dawson v. Holiday Pocono Civic Ass’n, Inc., 36 Pa. D. & C. 5th 449 (Common 
Pleas Pa. 2014) (residential use is “not restricted owner-occupied residential use” and the express 
authority to “lease” was not limited in duration, so short term rental allowed); see also Friedman v. 
Rozzlle, No. 13-12-00779-CV, 2013 WL 6175318 (Tex. Ct. App., Nov. 21, 2013) (community 
homeowners acquiescence in short term rentals in community for 19 years amounted to abandonment of 
restriction making the prohibition unenforceable). 
 85. See, e.g., Dunn v. Aamodt, 695 F.3d 797, 800 (8th Cir. 2012) (“residential purpose” phrase 
in covenants was ambiguous so would not be interpreted to preclude STRs); Applegate v. Colucci, 908 
N.E.2d 1214, 1216 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (STRs were “residential use”); Lowden v. Bosley, 909 A.2d 
261, 262 (Md. 2006) (residential purposes covenant did not preclude short term rental). 
 86. See, e.g., Houston v. Wilson Mesa Ranch Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 360 P.3d 255, 256-58 
(Colo. Ct. App. 2015) (short term rentals can be considered “residential” under covenants, “commercial 
use” prohibition in covenants does not preclude short term rentals, and mere procedural amendments 
invalid to allow imposition of fines for STRs was invalid); Estates at Desert Ridge Trails Homeowners 
Ass’n v. Vazquez, 300 P.3d 736, 738, 744,, 748 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (“residential purpose” limitation 
did not bar short term rentals and general rulemaking authority of association could not extend to 
restricting rental activity, meaning only unanimous approval for amendment would accomplish same); 
Mason Family Trust v. Devaney, 207 P.3d 1176, 1179 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009) (“dwelling purposes only” 
covenant that also prohibited business or commercial purposes did not preclude dwelling-based STRs); 
see also Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Ass’n, Inc., 556 S.W.3d 274 (Texas 2018) (neither “single 
family residence” nor “residential use” limitation in subdivision lot deed precluded short term rentals).  
For a similar result under that term in zoning, see Heef Realty & Investments LLP v. City of Cedarburg 
Board of Appeals, 861 N.W.2d 797, 798 (Wis. Ct. App. 2015) (“single family residential” zoning 
permitted short term rental).  But see In re Miller, 482 A.2d 688, 692 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1984) (boarding 
home violated single family residence zoning). 
 87. See, e.g., Vera Angel Revocable Trust v. O’Bryant, 537 S.W.3d 254 (Ark. 2018) (prohibition 
on “commercial use” in subdivision restrictive covenant not specific enough to preclude usage for short 
term rentals.); Slaby v. Mountain River Estates Residential Ass’n, Inc., 100 So. 3d 569, 580, 582 (Ala. 
Civ. App. 2012) (neither single family residence limit nor prohibition on commercial uses in covenants 
precluded short term rentals).  For a similar result interpreting these terms in zoning, see Siwinski v. 
Town of Ogden Dunes, 922 N.E.2d 751 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (short term rental was not a 
“commercial use” in violation of zoning ordinance).  But see Vonderhaar v. Lakeside Place 
Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., No. 2012-CA-002193-MR, 2014 WL 3887913, at *10-13 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 
8, 2014) (STRs, akin to hotels or motels, are a prohibited business use under the covenants, especially 
where declared as business for tax purposes). 
 88. See, e.g., Ross v. Bennett, 203 P.3d 383, 384 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (short term rentals, less 
than 30 days, were considered under covenants to be a permitted residential use and not a prohibited 
business use).  But see S. Ridge Homeowners’ Ass’n v. Brown, 226 P.3d 758 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) 
(weekly rentals violated restrictions on “nightly” rentals and “timeshares” in covenants); Monarch Point 
Homeowners Ass’n v. Arditi, No. G040668, 2009 WL 1838286, at *1-3 (June 26, 2009) (prohibition on 
“transient or hotel purposes” was properly interpreted in clarifying addendum as including the authority 
for the HOA to prohibit short term rentals less than 30 days). 
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prohibit short term rentals.89  In each of these situations, the “right to 
share” through short term rentals has usually been found present as 
surviving the initial agreement and protected when associations have 
attempted to claim violations of the governing rules and charge 
assessments for their alleged violation. 
Gadd v. Hensley,90 a March 2017 case from the Court of Appeals of 
Kentucky—is a good example of such a common resolution, interpreting 
HOA rules to allow short term rentals.  In Gadd, the court examined 
deed restrictions in a subdivision and found ambiguities that led it to 
conclude that short term rentals were not prohibited.  The subdivision 
deeds in question allowed rentals but without specifying any length 
restriction.91  The developer nonetheless tried to curtail the rights of 
Gadd to enter into short term rentals by claiming that the “single family 
residential use purposes” clause somehow modified the leasing clause to 
prohibit short term rentals.92  The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the developer.93  The court of appeals, though, reversed the lower 
court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the deeds were 
insufficiently clear to limit the rights of owners to engage in short 
duration rentals.94   
The court of appeals concluded that it was clear that the “language of 
the restrictive deed does not prevent Gadd from renting his property on a 
short term basis” because “[w]hen language is ambiguous [the court] is 
not permitted to constrain the free exercise of a property owner’s use of 
property.”95  In particular, the court reasoned, “Clearly, Gadd’s ability to 
rent his home for any length of time, short or long, supports his, the 
homeowner’s, unrestricted use of the property.  This interpretation 
protects the property owner.”96  Gadd represents an informative, 
straightforward interpretation of the typical covenant language regarding 
“residential” or “single family” uses or purposes.  Those provisions 
usually do not prohibit short term rentals—due in part to the courts 
putting a thumb on the scale of homeowners’ rights to exercise their 
property rights if not clearly abdicated by agreement, including the right 
 
 89. See, e.g., Scott v. Walker, 645 S.E.2d 278, 279 (Va. 2007) (ambiguous covenants must be 
interpreted in favor of free use of property and against restrictions so short term rental was allowed).   
But see Tarr v. Timberwood Park Owners Association, Inc., 510 S.W.3d 725, 731-32 (Tex. Ct. App. 
2016) (in a split with other Texas courts, holding restrictive covenant barred short term rentals within 
CIC). 
 90. Nos. 2015-CA-001948-MR, 2016-CA-000164-MR, 2017 WL 1102982 (Ky. Ct. App. March 
24, 2017). 
 91. Id. at *6-7. 
 92. Id. at *7. 
 93. Id. at *3. 
 94. Id. at *14, 16-18. 
 95. Id. at *17. 
 96. Id. at *16. 
22
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss3/1
2018] SHORT TERM RENTALS AND HOAS 915 
to include.  The court’s holding in Gadd is consistent with the idea that 
the right to share exists and the courts will presume that it has not been 
given over to the association to restrict when express provisions do not 
encompass such an alienation of control and when homeowners could 
not anticipate in the agreement that they would be so restricted. 
Of course, we know from precedent and experience regarding CICs 
and HOAs that rules can be changed.97  Further, as Part IV explained, 
owners’ rights to object to such changes are somewhat limited because 
they entered into community association agreements understanding that 
certain rights could be curtailed in the future.  There are generally two 
categories of options for expanding community governance to preclude 
or limit short term rentals—changes to rules via ordinary course and 
changes to declarations or bylaws under prescribed extraordinary 
(usually super-majority) procedures.98 Several recent cases have found 
that the former category of authority is not sufficiently broad in scope to 
allow the imposition of new restrictions on short term rentals not readily 
anticipated by existing declarations.  Several recent cases have also 
found, however, that substantive changes in declarations or bylaws have 
a much wider berth within which to expand restrictions on owners’ 
bundles of rights precisely because owners pre-committed to accept 
such changes provided extraordinary procedures precede their adoption 
and application. 
A March 2017 case from New York is illustrative of the point that 
ordinary association rule changes by the board alone cannot accomplish 
the imposition of restrictions on short term rentals that would otherwise 
be authorized under existing rights.  In Matter of Olszewski v. Cannon 
Point Association, Inc.,99 the New York Supreme Court Appellate 
Division examined condominium bylaws that granted homeowners the 
right to convey or lease his or her home “free of any restrictions.”100  
The court held that such language defining the homeowners rights 
would be rendered meaningless when an HOA board of directors adopts 
rules imposing numerous limitations on homeowners’ rental of their 
property.101  Thus, in the case, the court impliedly equated short term 
rentals to “leases”102 and refused enforcement of the restrictions on short 
 
 97. NATELSON, supra note 3, at §2.4. 
 98. Id. §3.3.2.1.  
 99. 148 A.D.3d 1306 (N.Y. App. Div. March 9, 2017). 
 100. Id. at 1308. 
 101. Id. at 1310. 
 102. There is some remaining debate over whether a short term rental as usually transacted in 
today’s sharing economy, such as through Airbnb, constitutes a “lease” in the legal sense that term is 
usually given in the context of property law, or whether it is a “lease” only in the more colloquial sense.  
A court concerned with such a distinction would need to evaluate whether the use of that term “lease” in 
an HOA or CIC document has a particular meaning and whether short term rentals fit into the 
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term rentals.103  However, at the end of its opinion, the court counseled 
that the association could—through proper procedures—amend the 
bylaws.  As the court in Olszewski explained that, because the 
homeowners “expressly were granted the right to lease their properties 
free of any restrictions,” then “to the extent that [the community 
members] wish to impose rules in this area, they may do so—but only if 
the rules so adopted do not in fact conflict with the rights and privileges 
conveyed to petitioners (and similarly situated homeowners) pursuant to 
the relevant provisions of the bylaws.”104  If the rules adopted conflict 
with rights granted, as they did under the facts in Olszewski, the 
community members could instead “successfully avail themselves of the 
procedures set forth in the declarations and bylaws relative to the 
amendment thereof.”105  The court further noted that the HOA should 
“persuade the required percentage of each association’s 
homeowners/members as to the merit of their position and amend the 
bylaws accordingly” if indeed the community members believed that the 
injury from the short term rentals was so substantial as to require a 
remedy.106  Nevertheless, the court reiterated that this more difficult 
avenue of change was required because “[a]bsent appropriate 
amendment to the relevant governing documents, however, the 2014 
rules constitute an impermissible exercise of [the association’s] 
powers.”107   
What might be called an “anti-shoehorning” rationale in Olszewski 
mirrors the rationale adopted in another very recent case regarding 
zoning boards and their authority to impose new zoning restrictions on 
short term rentals.  Although public regulatory controls are largely 
beyond the scope of this Article, a brief aside into that area is useful to 
flag some of the parallel discussions.  In a February 2017 opinion, the 
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania in Shvekh v. Zoning Hearing 
Board of Stroud Township108 held that even though a zoning board’s 
interpretation of its own ordinance is entitled to deference, it “cannot 
advance a new and strained interpretation of its zoning ordinance in 
order to effect what it would like the ordinance to say without an 
amendment.”109   The court explained that the zoning board could not 
 
documents’ definition of “lease” or “sublease.”  The court in Olszewski did not seem to see a need to 
draw a distinction.  Such matters of interpretation of the term “lease” will undoubtedly become 
important in these HOA STR cases, but those subjects of inquiry are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 103. Olszewski, 148 A.D.3d at 1311. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. 154 A.3d 408 (Pa. Commw. Ct. Feb. 6, 2017). 
 109. Id. at 414. 
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stretch its ordinance on “tourist homes” to encompass short term rentals 
of private residences, cautioning that “amendments cannot be effected 
by shoehorning a use that involves renting an entire single-family home 
to vacationers into the definition of ‘tourist home.’”110  If the zoning 
board wanted authority for that interpretation, the court admonished the 
board to seek an amendment to the ordinance instead.   
Despite the owner-protective ruling in Olszewski, we must remember 
that these cases turn on interpretations of words.  The cases are fact-
specific and often depend on the presence or absence of language in the 
restrictions and in the language of the governing documents.  Consider a 
different case with different declarations and bylaws leading to a 
different conclusion.  In Watts v. Oak Shores Community Association,111 
the California Court of Appeal in 2015 held that “homeowners 
associations may adopt reasonable rules and impose fees on members 
relating to short-term rentals of condominium units.”112  The court 
interpreted broadly the bylaws granting wide authority to adopt rules, 
including the power to adopt rules to protect quiet enjoyment—in light 
of evidence presented that showed that short term renters cause more 
problems and impose more costs than community owners impose.113  It 
explained that the “powers to adopt rules” includes rules for addressing 
such concerns even when they limit owners’ control over their 
property.114  Thus, while the court did not reject that there may be a right 
to share and that right may include the right to create short term rentals, 
when the owners do not preserve strong protections for their rights and 
concurrently confer broad authority by agreement to restrict those rights 
for the greater good of the community, then those owners cannot be said 
to complain if the broad power is exercised broadly.  How the balance is 
drafted in the governing agreement can make a substantial difference.    
Note that in the Watts case the court was confronted with a grant of 
authority, yet made no discussion of the existence of a concomitant 
broad grant of rights to be free from restrictions like seen in Olszewski.  
The absence of such a countervailing right allowed the court in Watts to 
construe the power to adopt rules more expansively.  If the HOA’s 
authority is written broadly enough and does not constrain the 
association from imposing short-term rental restrictions through rules, 
Watts illustrates the possibility that courts may uphold such board-
initiated actions. 
As explained in Part IV, the unique thing about the HOA short term 
 
 110. Id. at 415. 
 111. 235 Cal. App.4th 466 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
 112. Id. at 468. 
 113. Id. at 473. 
 114. Id. 
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rental cases is that an owner’s expectations include the possibility of 
change; rights to do something now do not always last in perpetuity if 
(1) the HOA substantive rulemaking authority is broad enough to allow 
changes or new rules through ordinary procedures designed to carry out 
existing mandates; or (2) the governing declarations or bylaws permit 
amendments to the HOA’s substantive rulemaking authority and 
mandates.  Change can be done with normal rulemaking in that first 
category, but cases like Olszewski illustrate the difficulties in doing so if 
there is not an express category of HOA authority with a broad enough 
scope to attack the issue at hand, i.e. if the existing authority is not wide 
enough that the owners could have anticipated the possibility of a rule 
against short term rentals as being encompassed within its scope.   
Allowable residential and single family home purposes are usually 
interpreted to allow short term rentals, so those types of provisions are 
insufficient to curtail inclusion rights.  There would need to be language 
that creates a foreseeable expectation of short term rental limitations that 
would allow an owner ex ante to anticipate the possibility their rights to 
engage in short term rentals would be precluded.  The interpretive rules 
are designed to allow the owners to make informed choices to enter into 
the CIC agreement reasonably able to foresee the consequences of 
ceding certain property rights to the authority of the community’s 
governing entities. 
The fact that a community’s constitution, bylaws, or declarations can 
be changed, however, is important.  Simply by agreeing to enter into a 
common interest community (including agreeing to give the CIC the 
power to liberally amend its primary governing documents)—and 
thereby assuming the risk that such amendments could include 
substantial limitations on the property owner’s rights as a result of 
(usually) supermajority choice—a homeowner is agreeing forever to a 
somewhat indeterminate bundle of sticks.115  They are, in effect, 
agreeing that rights that may exist when they move in (such as to enter 
into short term rentals) may not last forever and could be curtailed 
without standing to complain.   
A very instructive case on these principles of governance 
amendments is Adams v. Kimberley One Townhouse Owner’s 
Association, Inc., from the Idaho Supreme Court in June 2015.116  In 
2003, Virgil Adams purchased a lot in a subdivision, subject to CC&Rs 
 
 115. See, e.g., Filmor LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Centre Pointe Condominium, 333 P.3d 498, 
508 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014) (interpreting legislation on condo units to require a 90 percent vote to amend 
declaration or bylaws to impose leasing restrictions including because that interpretation “protects the 
reasonable and settled expectations of unit owners who purchased their units under the original 
declaration and advances the legislature’s intent to provide additional consumer protection to 
condominium purchasers”). 
 116. 352 P.3d 492 (Idaho 2015). 
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contained in a 1980 declaration which included provisions allowing for 
subsequent amendments to the declaration by a 2/3 vote of the 
subdivision lot owners.117  In 2012, Adams began entering into short-
term rental agreements for his property.118  In 2013, after numerous 
complaints about the behavior of various short term renters using 
Adams’s property, the 1980 declaration was amended by requisite 
supermajority vote to change the permitted use of subdivision lots.119  
Among other things, the 2013 amendments required board approval of 
rental documents and advertisements along with the prohibition of both 
subleases and rentals for fewer than six months.120  After Adams 
continued to enter into short term rentals in defiance of the 2013 
amendments, the board enacted house rules to impose penalties for each 
day a unit was rented ($300/day fine) or advertised ($100/day fine) in 
violation.121  Adams then brought a declaratory judgment action seeking 
to invalidate the 2013 amendments.122  The district court granted 
summary judgment to the Association, upholding the validity of the 
2013 amendments.123  The Idaho supreme court affirmed.   
The court held that the modifications in the 2013 amendments were 
not “new” unknown burdens added to the CC&Rs, but instead that they 
were anticipated within the broad amendment authority granted in the 
1980 declaration.  It further held that Adams was both subject to such 
restrictions and should have been aware of the possibility of such 
restrictions being imposed upon purchase, i.e., no legitimate reliance 
interests were affected.124  After identifying a split of authority among 
the states as to whether a new restriction on rental activity may be 
reasonably added under a general amendment provision or whether a 
new restriction is per se unreasonable, the supreme court found Idaho’s 
approach to CC&R amendments more consistent with the line of cases 
that adopt a case-by-case approach rather than a per se prohibition.125  
The court explained that while some amendments may go “too far” in 
changing the nature of original restrictions, the restrictions in this case 
did not do so.126  In fact, it explained that changes to CC&Rs should be 
liberally permitted under a general amendment provision and parties to 
CC&Rs should be bound by even significant future alterations unless an 
 
 117. Id. at 494 n. 2. 
 118. Id. at 494.  
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 495-99. 
 125. Id. at 496-98. 
 126. Id. at 497-98. 
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amendment term produces an unconscionable result.127  According to 
the court in the Adams case, the 2013 amendments simply narrowed 
what may be considered a “single family residential purpose” to reflect 
the long-term and stable occupancy implied by that condition on lot use 
“rather than it being used as a hotel as Adams had.”128   
In March 2017, the California Court of Appeal in Ocean Windows 
Owners Association v. Spataro (a non-citable, “not officially published” 
opinion),129 we see another application of the fact-specific or language-
specific approach.  In Ocean Windows, the HOA had asked the lower 
court to grant a petition that would allow approval of changes to its 
CC&R’s by a reduced voting percentage of its members.130  The 
proposed amendments were aimed at preventing short term and 
weekend rentals that many in the association had come to see as 
problematic—due to increased costs to the association due to trash 
pickup, security, project management, damage to common areas and the 
like.131  The proposed amendments got only 71%, not the 75% 
supermajority required to pass under their bylaws.132  Thus, the HOA 
petition to amend by a lower percentage of approving owners upon court 
approval (available to it by statute) followed.  The lower court granted 
the petition.  The property owner aggrieved by the new rule argued that 
the lower court abused its discretion—not because there were any 
procedural errors in the vote but based instead on a claim that there was 
not a sufficient showing that the amendments were “necessary” for the 
good of the community, something she claimed was a required element 
to grant these petitions to allow reduced voting percentages by statutory 
right.133  The Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court, and in so doing 
rejected the property owner’s definition of the standard, explaining that 
the proposed amendments need only be “reasonable” to qualify for the 
granting of a petition.134  Moreover, after identifying substantial 
evidence in the record, the Court of Appeal held that the proposed new 
restrictions were, indeed, reasonable in light of injury caused the 
community from short term rentals and the lower court properly 
 
 127. Id. at 498. 
 128. Id.  For a similar recent case where the court has enforced a properly enacted Declaration 
Amendment with the requisite number of homeowners in a community voting to adopt the change in the 
restrictions to include prohibitions on short term rentals, see North Country Properties, LLC v. Lost 
Acres Homeowners Association of Burnett, 879 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. Ct. App. March 22, 2016). 
 129. No. D066852, 2017 WL 1075056 (Cal. Ct. App. March 22, 2017). 
 130. Id. at *3-5. 
 131. Id. at *10, *14. 
 132. Id. at *9-10. 
 133. Id. at *12-13. 
 134. Id. at *2. 
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exercised its broad discretion when granting the petition.135 
These lines of cases are consistent with the general rules interpreting 
the consent to be governed and owners’ acceptance of restrictions on 
property rights in common interest communities.  So much depends on 
the language of the instruments of agreement.136  Homeowners joining 
common interest communities are presumed to come to the agreement 
table having the right to enter into short term rentals of their property.  
This sharing right is presumed to survive the agreement to be governed 
by community rules unless there is some evidence in the agreement to 
the contrary.  Nonetheless, most CICs also allow for relatively liberal 
amendments to their governing documents.  Unless the amendment 
authority is sufficiently limited in scope, restrictions on short term 
rentals are very likely to be upheld within the scope of allowable 
amendments.   
If homeowners wish to provide armor against amendments that would 
curtail such rights, express limits on the substantive scope of 
amendment authority rather than simply procedural protections of 
supermajority rules should be included within the language of the 
bylaws.  Conversely, associations that wish to have the authority to 
impose rules can learn from these cases that the governing documents 
should be drafted broadly enough in the first instance to confer such 
power to prohibit or regulate short term rentals.  If they are not, then 
such associations or members in the community wishing to limit short 
term rentals should seek to amend the declarations or bylaws and 
declaration to permit such broader authority. 
Finally, associations and homeowners should be aware of and, if 
desired, responsive to, creative rule circumvention techniques.  
Remember, drafting with precision matters and drafting in anticipation 
of creative ways to skirt the rules can be equally important.  For 
example, one recent report warned associations that “governing 
documents [even when they include restrictions on short-term rentals] 
may not be adequate enough to prevent the savvy owner from taking 
advantage of potential ambiguities.”137  This attorney explained that 
homeowners will get creative when they need to: “For example, if an 
owner can obtain a one-year lease from a short-term renter that provides 
for early termination with no penalty, the owner is then able to provide a 
valid lease agreement to the association, effectively providing a short-
 
 135. Id. at *15.  
 136. Franzese, supra note 48, at 672 (“As to the former means of imposing restrictions, the 
CC&R or ‘Declaration of Condominium’ is the community’s master document”). 
 137. Theresa L. Donovan, Does your Community Association have sufficient protections in place 
for Short-Term Vacation Rentals?, THE CONDO AND HOA LAW BULLETIN (Apr. 17, 2017),  
https://thecondoandhoalawbulletin.com/2017/04/17/short-term-rentals/. 
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term lease disguised as a long-term lease.”138  When language matters, 
cases can turn on what is stated and, critically sometimes, what is not 
stated—with the latter having particular importance when interpretive 
rules tend to favor property rights, erring on the side of protecting 
homeowner uses not expressly prohibited. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The reason for the presumptions seen in the cases evaluated in this 
Article, and the explanation for why some methods work to curtail short 
term rental rights while others do not, rest again on the right to include 
and the subcategory within it that is the right to share.  Because it is a 
stick in the property owner’s bundle of rights, the sharing branch 
stemming off the inclusion stick will presumptively survive an owner’s 
agreement to enter into a common interest community.  It will only be 
abrogated upon identifiable language in the initial agreement making 
such diminishment of the right possible.  Such authority in the initial 
declaration might confer upon the HOA the power to curtail the 
homesharing right from the outset, or it might only be limited after 
amendment procedures create such authority to control the sharing right, 
with such amendments being made pursuant to the homeowner’s 
consent to such future alterations in the balance between her rights and 
the association’s authority.  In other words, an owner’s rights to engage 
in short term rentals may become limited if an owner agreed to give up 
perpetual control of the sharing stick when they entered the common 
interest community, but not before they have done so. 
 
 138. Id. 
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